Online Mixed Packing and Covering

In many problems, the inputs arrive over time, and must be dealt with irrevocably when they arrive. Such problems are online problems. A common method of solving online problems is to first solve the corresponding linear program, and then round the fractional solution online to obtain an integral solution. We give algorithms for solving linear programs with mixed packing and covering constraints online. We first consider mixed packing and covering linear programs, where packing constraints are given offline and covering constraints are received online. The objective is to minimize the maximum multiplicative factor by which any packing constraint is violated, while satisfying the covering constraints. No prior sublinear competitive algorithms are known for this problem. We give the first such --- a polylogarithmic-competitive algorithm for solving mixed packing and covering linear programs online. We also show a nearly tight lower bound. Our techniques for the upper bound use an exponential penalty function in conjunction with multiplicative updates. While exponential penalty functions are used previously to solve linear programs offline approximately, offline algorithms know the constraints beforehand and can optimize greedily. In contrast, when constraints arrive online, updates need to be more complex. We apply our techniques to solve two online fixed-charge problems with congestion. These problems are motivated by applications in machine scheduling and facility location. The linear program for these problems is more complicated than mixed packing and covering, and presents unique challenges. We show that our techniques combined with a randomized rounding procedure give polylogarithmic-competitive integral solutions. These problems generalize online set-cover, for which there is a polylogarithmic lower bound. Hence, our results are close to tight

The Complexity of Partial Function Extension for Coverage Functions

Coverage functions are an important subclass of submodular functions, finding applications in machine learning, game theory, social networks, and facility location. We study the complexity of partial function extension to coverage functions. That is, given a partial function consisting of a family of subsets of [m] and a value at each point, does there exist a coverage function defined on all subsets of [m] that extends this partial function? Partial function extension is previously studied for other function classes, including boolean functions and convex functions, and is useful in many fields, such as obtaining bounds on learning these function classes. We show that determining extendibility of a partial function to a coverage function is NP-complete, establishing in the process that there is a polynomial-sized certificate of extendibility. The hardness also gives us a lower bound for learning coverage functions. We then study two natural notions of approximate extension, to account for errors in the data set. The two notions correspond roughly to multiplicative point-wise approximation and additive L_1 approximation. We show upper and lower bounds for both notions of approximation. In the second case we obtain nearly tight bounds

A Stackelberg Strategy for Routing Flow over Time

Routing games are used to to understand the impact of individual users' decisions on network efficiency. Most prior work on routing games uses a simplified model of network flow where all flow exists simultaneously, and users care about either their maximum delay or their total delay. Both of these measures are surrogates for measuring how long it takes to get all of a user's traffic through the network. We attempt a more direct study of how competition affects network efficiency by examining routing games in a flow over time model. We give an efficiently computable Stackelberg strategy for this model and show that the competitive equilibrium under this strategy is no worse than a small constant times the optimal, for two natural measures of optimality

The Network Improvement Problem for Equilibrium Routing

In routing games, agents pick their routes through a network to minimize their own delay. A primary concern for the network designer in routing games is the average agent delay at equilibrium. A number of methods to control this average delay have received substantial attention, including network tolls, Stackelberg routing, and edge removal. A related approach with arguably greater practical relevance is that of making investments in improvements to the edges of the network, so that, for a given investment budget, the average delay at equilibrium in the improved network is minimized. This problem has received considerable attention in the literature on transportation research and a number of different algorithms have been studied. To our knowledge, none of this work gives guarantees on the output quality of any polynomial-time algorithm. We study a model for this problem introduced in transportation research literature, and present both hardness results and algorithms that obtain nearly optimal performance guarantees. - We first show that a simple algorithm obtains good approximation guarantees for the problem. Despite its simplicity, we show that for affine delays the approximation ratio of 4/3 obtained by the algorithm cannot be improved. - To obtain better results, we then consider restricted topologies. For graphs consisting of parallel paths with affine delay functions we give an optimal algorithm. However, for graphs that consist of a series of parallel links, we show the problem is weakly NP-hard. - Finally, we consider the problem in series-parallel graphs, and give an FPTAS for this case. Our work thus formalizes the intuition held by transportation researchers that the network improvement problem is hard, and presents topology-dependent algorithms that have provably tight approximation guarantees.Comment: 27 pages (including abstract), 3 figure

Network improvement for equilibrium routing

Routing games are frequently used to model the behavior of traffic in large networks, such as road networks. In transportation research, the problem of adding capacity to a road network in a cost-effective manner to minimize the total delay at equilibrium is known as the Network Design Problem, and has received considerable attention. However, prior to our work, little was known about guarantees for polynomial-time algorithms for this problem. We obtain tight approximation guarantees for general and series-parallel networks, and present a number of open questions for future work

Partial Function Extension with Applications to Learning and Property Testing

Partial function extension is a basic problem that underpins multiple research topics in optimization, including learning, property testing, and game theory. Here, we are given a partial function consisting of n points from a domain and a function value at each point. Our objective is to determine if this partial function can be extended to a function defined on the domain, that additionally satisfies a given property, such as linearity. We formally study partial function extension to fundamental properties in combinatorial optimization - subadditivity, XOS, and matroid independence. A priori, it is not clear if partial function extension for these properties even lies in NP (or coNP). Our contributions are twofold. Firstly, for the properties studied, we give bounds on the complexity of partial function extension. For subadditivity and XOS, we give tight bounds on approximation guarantees as well. Secondly, we develop new connections between partial function extension and learning and property testing, and use these to give new results for these problems. In particular, for subadditive functions, we give improved lower bounds on learning, as well as the first subexponential-query tester

On the Welfare of Cardinal Voting Mechanisms

A voting mechanism is a method for preference aggregation that takes as input preferences over alternatives from voters, and selects an alternative, or a distribution over alternatives. While preferences of voters are generally assumed to be cardinal utility functions that map each alternative to a real value, mechanisms typically studied assume coarser inputs, such as rankings of the alternatives (called ordinal mechanisms). We study cardinal mechanisms, that take as input the cardinal utilities of the voters, with the objective of minimizing the distortion - the worst-case ratio of the best social welfare to that obtained by the mechanism. For truthful cardinal mechanisms with m alternatives and n voters, we show bounds of Theta(mn), Omega(m), and Omega(sqrt{m}) for deterministic, unanimous, and randomized mechanisms respectively. This shows, somewhat surprisingly, that even mechanisms that allow cardinal inputs have large distortion. There exist ordinal (and hence, cardinal) mechanisms with distortion O(sqrt{m log m}), and hence our lower bound for randomized mechanisms is nearly tight. In an effort to close this gap, we give a class of truthful cardinal mechanisms that we call randomized hyperspherical mechanisms that have O(sqrt{m log m}) distortion. These are interesting because they violate two properties - localization and non-perversity - that characterize truthful ordinal mechanisms, demonstrating non-trivial mechanisms that differ significantly from ordinal mechanisms. Given the strong lower bounds for truthful mechanisms, we then consider approximately truthful mechanisms. We give a mechanism that is delta-truthful given delta in (0,1), and has distortion close to 1. Finally, we consider the simple mechanism that selects the alternative that maximizes social welfare. This mechanism is not truthful, and we study the distortion at equilibria for the voters (equivalent to the Price of Anarchy, or PoA). While in general, the PoA is unbounded, we show that for equilibria obtained from natural dynamics, the PoA is close to 1. Thus relaxing the notion of truthfulness in both cases allows us to obtain near-optimal distortion